to times do not make spatial shapes objectionably extrinsic.
1 Special relativity (SR) adds a new dimension to the issue by relativizing three-dimensional (3D) spatial shapes not just to times, but to times-in-frames, due to Lorentz contraction.
2 What stands behind all the different 3D shapes, however, is an invariant four-dimensional (4D) shape of the spacetime region swept by an object throughout its lifetime. In fact, the invariance, and hence intrinsicality, of the 4D shapes in SR can be used to defend four-dimensionalism about persistence against three-dimensionalism 3 -if 4D shapes are indeed intrinsic in SR.
In a recent note, however, Matthew Davidson questions the intrinsicality of 4D shapes in SR. He considers three 4D objects, o, o 1 and o 2 , in fast uniform relative motion, where o persists for only a minute: o 1 and o 2 see the entirety of o's 4D shape by perceiving a series of 3D shapes. The 4D shape o 1 'sees' is different than the shape o 2 sees due to differing amounts of Lorentz contraction; the 4D shape will be spatially thinner and will have a longer lifespan for o 1 than for o 2 . Thus, it looks as though we also need to relativize 4D shape to reference frames; thus, 4D shape also is not intrinsic (Davidson 2014: 58 , with minor changes in the notation).
This conclusion and the reasoning behind it are in error. Let us set aside a potentially misleading 'seeing' metaphor 4 and focus on what really matters in the situation envisaged by Davidson: the various 3D and 4D shapes o actually has in different reference frames, no matter whether anyone 'sees' them. To fix ideas, suppose a 600-ft-diameter spherical object pops into existence at t ¼ 0, persists at rest for 60 s, then goes out of existence. The shaded rectangle in Figure 1a represents the 4D shape of o in its rest frame (x,t), with two dimensions of space suppressed (the real 4D shape of o is hyper-cylindrical). The 3D spatial shapes of o at successive moments of time in (x,t) are 'horizontal' cross-sections of the shaded region, all featuring 600-ft-diameter 3D spheres. (The perdurantist will refer to them as temporal parts of o in (x,t).) 3 As is done in Balashov 2010. For discussions of this argument, see Gibson and Pooley 2006, Gilmore 2008, and Sattig, forthcoming, chapter 8. Now consider the same situation in the rest frames (x 0 ,t 0 ) and (x 00 ,t 00 ) of o 1 and o 2 , moving relative to o.
5 The corresponding 3D spatial shapes of o at successive moments of time in (x 0 ,t 0 ) and (x 00 ,t 00 ) are again the 'horizontal' cross-sections of the shaded region. Their series are rather different from the series of o's 3D shapes in its rest frame. In (x 0 ,t 0 ) and (x 00 ,t 00 ), o emerges as a single point 'from the right,' then 'grows' to an ellipsoid with 500-ft or 450-ft cross-sections along the x direction, then shrinks to a single point 'on the left,' eventually going out of existence. As should be expected, the 3D shapes of o are relative to times-in-frames, due to Lorentz contraction (Figures 1b  and 1c) . 5 For simplicity, the velocities of o 1 and o 2 in the x direction are chosen so that the contraction/dilation factors ¼ 1=ˇð1 À v 2 =c 2 Þ between (x 0 ,t 0 ) and (x,t), and between (x 00 ,t 00 ) and (x,t) are, respectively, 6/5 and 4/3. o 1 and o 2 themselves are omitted from Figures 1b and c.
Crucially, however (and contrary to Davidson), the 4D shape of o -the hyper-cylindrical shape of all three shaded regions in Figures 1a-c - Figures 1a-c) , the 'lifespan' of the 4D shape of o in (x 00 ,t 00 ), say, is simply the duration of its projection along the t 00 -axis, that is 45 s. This hardly has much to do with the lifetime of o itself in (x 00 ,t 00 ). A much better candidate for the latter role would be the lifetime of any material part of o, as determined in (x 00 ,t 00 ). Consider, for example, the leftmost material part of o. Its lifetime, as determined in (x 00 ,t 00 ), is in fact longer (80 s, see Figure 1c ) than its proper lifetime (and the proper time of the whole object o) in its rest frame, due to relativistic time dilation. Although Hatzimoysis offers an interesting way of expanding on something that Sartre says, his suggestion about how one might read the text does nothing to remove the central inconsistency that I have discussed: with respect to that aim, Hatzimoysis's suggestion is a red herring. Pace Hatzimoysis, the inconsistency remains.
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To recap my claim: in the Sketch, Sartre's dominant line of thought about emotion is that it is a 'magical' strategy, to which people resort when they encounter practical difficulty, to escape that difficulty. They do this by changing its appearance, i.e., by making it disappear. And these difficult appearances are altered by altering the consciousness of them.
Sartre puts it like this:
[Emotion] is a transformation of the world. When the paths before us become too difficult, or when we cannot see our way, we can no longer put up with such an exacting and difficult world. All ways are barred and nevertheless we must act. So then we try and to change the world; that is, to live it as though the relations between things and their potentialities were not governed by deterministic processes but by magic.
3
For Sartre, emotion is not something that the subject passively undergoes; it is a purposive, irrational and escapist strategy. 
